


















































































































































































































































































































Economics, Politics and Culture as Influences on Corporate Structures 
The idea that the Anglo American Berle/Means type of public listed company, 
characterised by a separation of ownership and management resulting from the 
need of growing enterprises for capital and the specialisation of management, is 
the most economically rational of large business organisational forms has been 
increasingly questioned in recent work. Roe argues that an important part of the 
Berle-Means corporation is the product of American politics, not just economic 
necessity.1 He argues that the political element has two parts. The first being 
that powerful laws barred or restricted intermediaries in governance roles 
during most of the 20th century, a century which has been essentially one of 
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growth for large firms. The second element according to Roe is that there is 
enough similarity in the pattern behind some of these laws to challenge whether 
economic evolution alone explains the shape of the large public firm. His thesis 
is that if the political system fragments intermediaries (and American populism, 
federalism, and interest groups in fighting did fragment them) then the Berle-
Means corporation is inevitable.2 
The classical economic explanation would, if it were universal in application, 
tend to predict that nations with similar economics would have similar 
corporate structures. Just as there may be a best way to manufacture a particular 
product such as steel, on this approach there is a best way to organise large steel 
firms. Therefore, managerial incentive compensation schemes, proxy fights, 
conglomerates takeovers, and boards of independent outsiders, all of which 
reflect the attempt to reduce the agency costs of organising the large American 
public firm should play a role in corporate governance in Germany and Japan. 
According to Roe, the absence of these features in the structures prevalent in 
Germany and Japan poses a challenge in that it shows that there is more than 
one way to deal with the large firm's organisational problems.3 These 
differences in corporate structure indicate that differences in political histories, 
cultures and paths of economic development have a part to play in explaining 
the different structures.4 The purely economic model, although important, must 
be considered in the context of these other factors and their no doubt complex 
interrelationships better understood. Therefore, much more research is required 
to understand and explain the relative role and interaction of each of these and 
possibly other factors in the development of corporate structures and modes of 
governance. 
In the modern global economy competition exists not only among products, but 
also among governance systems. It is argued by some that the Chinese family 
business has a rationality of its own.5 According to the Columbian school of 
thought real world competition has obliged business scholarship to focus on 
comparative corporate governance and in the light of the sometimes, if not 
often, better performance of other systems understanding the differences has 
become urgent.6 However, models of governance elsewhere do not simply have 
the purpose, like the American system of solving the Berle-Means monitoring 
problem but often serve additional functions. Gilson and Roe have, for 
example, developed a model of the Japanese Keiretsu as involving not only 
governance, but also the need to support production and exchange, a system for 
which they coin the term “contractual governance”.7 I will return to this 
approach in the context of the Chinese family corporation later, when exploring 
the concept of networks of personalistic relationships which are often both 
internal and external to the Chinese firm. 
Nevertheless, the Columbian analysis and the role of comparative governance 
studies has its detractors. In particular, Romano emphasises that without a 
means to make comparative judgments, truly helpful lessons cannot be drawn 
from other nations' experiences for the purpose of reforming corporate 
governance or at least the possibility of doing so is diminished. This 
undermines the rationale for making comparisons in the first place. Why, for 
example, should the corporate organisational form produced by a political 
process that empowers banks be viewed as preferable to a process that does not, 
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without evidence of the superiority of the former organisational form? In 
reviewing extensive data on relative competitiveness she argues that the 
assumption of the superior competitiveness of German and Japanese firms over 
US firms is mistaken.8 Other recent work by Edwards and Fischer on the merits 
of the bank based system in Germany, shows that the positive view of that 
system is not supported by the evidence.The supposed advantages of the bank's 
control of voting rights and representation on supervisory boards which, inter 
alia, allow for reduced asymmetric information problems thereby enabling 
banks to supply more external finance to firms at a lower cost and increase 
investment; and the control of management of firms on behalf of shareholders 
ensuring efficiency in terms of agency costs and outputs are overrated, 
according to Edwards and Fischer.9 
They do however emphasise that there are many other respects in which 
Germany differs from eg, the UK or indeed other economies, which may be 
relevant for relative economic performance since 1945. These other factors 
could include: Germany's system of education and training, its structure of 
industrial democracy reducing confrontation between labour and management 
or contributing to overall efficiency as well as the country's macro economic 
policy. It is recognised therefore that it is impossible to conclude anything 
about the contribution of the German financial system to German economic 
performance on the basis of simple correlations which do not take account of 
other possible influences.10 Nevertheless, problems of comparative study aside, 
the point is well made that other factors are relevant in the understanding of 
economic competitiveness, the development of corporate structures and their 
legal regimes. 
In this regard three basic points may be made about Hong Kong's economy and 
the nature of its largely family dominated businesses. They are first that its 
economy has some crucial differences particularly in its use of capital. Redding 
has argued that when comparing the overseas Chinese economies at large 
including Hong Kong's, with those of Japan, Europe and North America, the 
way capital is used in those Chinese contexts is different. There is a different 
strategic tendency, indicated by (a) the proliferation of small firms among the 
overseas Chinese, (b) the avoidance of highly complex, integrated, capital 
intensive structures such as are needed in car manufacture and heavy industry 
and (c) the tendency to concentrate in property, banking, commercial trading, 
and small scale manufacture.11 This facet is closely interrelated with the second 
point namely the nature of the Chinese family firm, its strengths and problems 
in relation to its patrimonialistic control, the close relationship between 
authority and ownership and the firms external relationships being largely 
dependant on personalistic networks with suppliers, customers and other third 
parties.12 This in turn leads to the third proposition which is also closely related 
to the first two, namely the relatively short life cycle of Chinese businesses and 
the fact that few Chinese companies in Hong Kong have reached the stage of 
separation of ownership and management. When they do there is a strong 
tendency to split up rather than successfully negotiate such a separation for a 
number of reasons which are partly cultural in nature.13 The Berle-Means type 
corporation has simply not developed as a common type to date.14 
I now propose to examine some key elements of the Chinese family firm and 
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weave in, where appropriate, relevant similarities and differences in mainland 
China since, post 1997, the influence of business practice and corporate 
governance between Hong Kong's SAR and China will increasingly become a 
two way traffic. 
 
Hong Kong's “Chinese family” corporations 
Before considering Hong Kong it is important to note that according to Kirby15 
the history of company law in the first half of the twentieth century in China 
tends to show that the assumption of early reformers regarding the anonymous 
private corporation on a Western model as the essential means to “facilitate 
commerce and help industries”, proved over optimistic. The record shows that 
with its own organisational structures and values rooted in networks of family 
and regional ties, what may be termed a “capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics” resisted the corporate structure even in the period of its 
dynamic growth in the first half of the twentieth century. However leery of 
government, China's capitalists appeared even more suspicious of the public, 
finding the idea that they would be invited to share in one's business's control 
and profits most dislikeable.16 
A similar tendency is discernible in Hong Kong where Chinese businessmen 
initially rejected the partnership and corporate law imported from the UK, 
which they found quite alien, insisting on their Chinese partnership legal 
regime. Apart from the Western educated elite,17only after the second world 
war did local Chinese businessmen take to using the corporate form as a legal 
vehicle for business activity. So successful has the adoption of this legal form 
been that almost two thirds of all business registrations today are registered in 
the name of corporate bodies.18 
 
The Legal Regime 
The Law of Hong Kong is primarily influenced by that of England and Wales 
and to a lesser extent by that of Australia.19 Hong Kong public companies, are 
in the main incorporated for a non commercial or quasi charitable purpose.20 
Those which are of a purely commercial or business nature are usually listed 
and quite closely controlled, since the minimum percentage of equity securities 
which must be in public hands may be between 10% and 25% depending on the 
market value of the applicant, and this is only exceptionally exceeded.21 The 
vast majority of companies (both large and small) are private in nature.22 From 
approximately 2000 companies registered in 1948 the number has risen to 
471,883 by December 1995. To this must be added the increasing number of 
offshore incorporations which for political and fiscal reasons are often situated 
in tax havens such as the Bahamas or the British Virgin Islands.23 Indeed the 
majority of Hong Kong's listed companies have, post 1989, incorporated their 
ultimate holding companies offshore.24 
Many public listed and private Hong Kong companies retain many of the 
characteristics of small scale family businesses, such as paternalism, 
personalism, opportunism and flexibility, even when conducting a very large 
scale of operations. They do not display the characteristics of separation of 
5 
 
ownership and control, professionalisation, bureaucratisation and neutralisation 
to anywhere near the same extent as their Western equivalents.25 
There are even more fundamental differences in Hong Kong in relation to the 
core nature of the Chinese controlled corporation. In the Chinese context 
personal connections or guangxi have remained a key element of Chinese 
organisation. Law was never really available in China as a practical recourse for 
the merchant, and without such a backing all relationships remained 
personalised.26 This in turn produced a barrier to the scale of enterprise, as 
important transactions would only be made face to face, and it made redundant 
any need for the professional executive who would rationally pursue goals on 
the part of others as part of a contractual exchange.27 As Faure points out, for a 
long period of Chinese history, lineage and family connections were, and were 
recognised to be, the most fundamental relationships in economic organisation, 
not only for consumption but also for production and trade.28 By placing a 
heavy emphasis on the family form of society, Confucianism sanctioned a 
family based economic system.29 
In China “law” was traditionally an expression of the rule of heaven (tianli or 
tiandao) and from this concept came the idea of gongdao which may roughly be 
translated as “justice” and is a term usually used when people think that a result 
is unacceptable or unjust and that something should be done to put it right. In 
theory law should be in harmony with, or in case of contradiction subordinate 
to, “the people's feeling” (renquing) following the view that “the rule of heaven 
is great because it is in line with people's feelings”.30 As the dominant school 
confucianism placed emphasis on “people's feeling” (renquing). Individuals are 
therefore more concerned about the feelings of those with whom closer 
personalistic ties (guanxi) exist. Since the family was conceived by Confucius 
as the basic social unit, family ties or feelings are strongest. From these basic 
units a network of class is formed and degrees of relationship with people from 
the same village or locality (tongxiang).31 As a general rule, the combined 
effects of this emphasis on “people's feeling” and confucianism are that the 
closer the relationship the better the treatment will be: generally family 
members should be trusted and treated best, secondly your clansmen, then 
friends and colleagues and those who live in the same village, bear the same 
surname32or come from the same locality or province, and finally those who 
have no relationship with you.33 There remain however some metatheoretical 
issues in the study of Chinese social interaction one of which is that the 
distinction between ideology, “ideal culture”, or “big traditions” and on the 
ground behaviour,“real culture”, or “little traditions”, is insufficiently drawn. 
This encourages an overly enthusiastic application of confucian precepts to 
modern chinese life.34 
According to Hamilton35 one of the most successful attempts to envision the 
patterned differences between Western and Chinese societies is that of Fei 
Xiaotong originally published in 1947.36 Explaining the organisational and 
social psychological differences between China and the West, Fei uses two 
extended metaphors to explain the distinctive patterning in each society. 
Western society is compared to the way rice straw is gathered to build a 
haystack. Individuals obtain their identities from the organisation to which they 
belong or are affiliated to. These organisations have clearly defined boundaries. 
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Organisations such as a club, or the office or a division of a corporation in 
which one works fit into other organisations, such as a city and so on, until the 
highest level subsuming organisation is reached. Fei believes this to be the 
Western state. In Hamilton's terms individuals fall under specific and distinct 
jurisdictions and take their rights and duties accordingly. Organisations from 
the club to the corporate workplace to the state legitimately constrain individual 
actions in separate but distinct ways.37 
Chinese society in contrast does not build upon distinct basic social units. Fei 
demonstrates that even the Chinese family (jia) is not a clear social unit in the 
way it is in the West, but is ambiguous as to which relatives are included within 
this definition. The metaphor he uses for Chinese society is that of concentric 
rings flowing out from the centre when a stone is thrown into a lake. A Chinese 
person stands at the centre of the circles produced by his or her own social 
influence. The rings near the centre are those of kinship relations which are 
many and varied but they do take precedence over other more distant 
relationships as indicated above. Everyone's circles of influence or rings of 
relationship are interrelated, but no one person has exactly the same set. Unlike 
the clearly “organisational” jurisdictions in the West, Chinese relationships are 
ranked and the duties for each relationship are publicly known and to some 
extent codified. Fei suggests that individuals calculate their actions by knowing, 
not where they are organisationally, but rather by knowing with whom they are 
dealing and knowing the relationship that prevails. 
Recent work on the role of personalistic relationships in China and the 
development of its new legal system has emphasised the continuing importance 
of such patterns of behaviour38 and these are often mirrored in the internal 
management function and decision making process of mainland enterprises 
even at board level. As Child observes of senior mainland managers: 
The cultural tradition within which they work leads to an 
expectation that managers will attempt to accommodate the 
demands placed upon them through personal relations in which 
they endeavour to establish some tolerance based upon trust and 
negotiate in a relatively harmonious fashion some space within 
which to operate.39 
In China the influence of renzhi and its direct counterpart guanxi inevitably lead 
to the “rule of the virtuous man”, rather than the rule of law. However, renzhi 
often results in government by whim or caprice. There are numerous examples 
of this, which when combined with government and justice by guanxi, often 
lead to attempts to nullify the rules which do exist or pervert the course of 
justice. This is also reflected to some extent in Hong Kong.40 It has serious 
implications for regulatory compliance and enforcement. 
 
Culture and Governance 
The role of culture in the Hong Kong corporate governance context has also 
been examined by Tricker. He points out that the word “man” with all of its 
overtones of separateness, free will and individualism does not overlap in 
meaning with the Chinese word yan with all its overtones of connectedness and 
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reciprocal relations. This has important implications for corporate governance. 
The original Western concept of the corporate entity creates a juristic person 
separate and distinct from its members. That juristic entity in law takes on the 
attributes of a person, a Western person. By way of contrast the Chinese 
perception of the nature of man as not being “separate” but connected and 
imbued with overtones of reciprocal relations “entails correspondingly different 
expectations of the corporate entity”.41 There is no real separation between 
family and company interests and a resulting lack of clarity as to where 
corporate boundaries lie. Furthermore, the question has been posed whether, 
given the lack of abstracts in the Chinese language and underlying differences 
in thought processes, the basic abstract concepts necessary for the development 
of modern Western corporations, and not only the concept of “separate legal 
personality”, but also “marketing function”, “financial control” and 
“divisionalisation”, are not just foreign but somehow unnatural to Chinese 
organisations.42 
Officials of Western origin in the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission (SFC) have expressed concern that the controllers of local listed 
companies sometimes fail to grasp the distinction between corporate and family 
property.43 Perhaps the real concern is that in importing Western corporate 
concepts regulators have failed to realise the significance of local culture and 
that the local perspective of and use of the corporate form is in some ways 
fundamentally different. The problem is exacerbated by the ambiguities of 
relationships in relation to property which is exemplified by the following 
quotes: 
You have to understand a Chinese family. There is no difference 
between my father's personal investments versus my personal 
investments. Its one. It is called family investment and that is 
it.44 
And in contrast: 
Capital accumulation is to keep the company running. That was 
my father's philosophy. It is not personal property. It belongs to 
all contributors, the staff included.45 
The latter quote may be viewed in terms of a family estate not being personal 
property in the sense of belonging to an individual but as family property in the 
sense that the family estate is a business and the family is notionally extended 
to include loyal staff.46 
This attitude to property may also be reflected in the patterns of corporate 
control. As Scott has commented: 
Any comparative account of corporate control must recognise 
that while there are certain uniformities of technology and 
business practice in all of the major capitalist economies there 
are equally important divergencies arising from specific 
historical experiences and differing cultural and legal systems. 
These national variations shape the constraints which operate on 
the actions and orientation of business leaders and result in the 
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existence of a number of alternative patterns of capitalist 
development. The pattern taken by impersonal possession in 
Britain, the USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand is to be 
seen as the outcome of a specific convergence of national and 
international forces in the Anglo-American, English speaking 
world. In other parts of the world, and under the impact of other 
forces, different patterns of impersonal possession are 
apparent.47 
The separate juristic nature of the corporation and its economic counterpart the 
concept of personal property represented by shares in the corporation as distinct 
from industrial property represented by the property owned by the registered 
company does not fit well with the cultural milieu of the Chinese family firm. 
Although the Western based legal business system in Hong Kong gave Chinese 
entrepreneurs a freedom of opportunity which they seized, it was adapted to 
their cultural context.48 Incorporation is used and limited liability welcomed, 
but the underlying nature of a Chinese family owned business has significant 
implications for a Western concept of corporate governance. Chinese family 
based organisations are described as being imbued with “patrimonialism”, 
which includes features such as paternalism, hierarchy, responsibility, mutual 
obligation, family atmosphere, personalism and protectionism. Redding 
identifies three related themes which flow from these and are in some senses 
expressions of patrimonialism: the idea that power cannot really exist unless it 
is connected to ownership; a distinct style of benevolently autocratic leadership 
and personalised as opposed to neutral relations.49 
A distinct and particularly Chinese organisational characteristic, viewed from a 
Western managerial perspective as a defect, arises because corporate power 
derives from ownership which is vested in a family rather than an individual. 
Nobody outside the owning group can generate for himself truly legitimate 
authority. Chinese family businesses are often unable to escape autocratic 
control because of a common inability to delegate and inherent mistrust 
(especially of professionals) makes it very difficult to graft into the organisation 
a middle and senior management group made up of competent professionals.50 
Wong identifies various instances when a Chinese family business comes under 
breakup stresses. One of these is the third generation problem which clearly 
reflects a major difficulty in pushing a Chinese family business through a 
Western style managerial revolution to transfer power to professional 
executives and divorce, to some extent, ownership and control.51 Resistance to 
the competent non family executive remains strong and is potentially dangerous 
for him if he is perceived as a threat. Given the endemic leaning towards 
secrecy in Chinese family businesses, as in other aspects of life, simply 
knowing too much about the business could constitute such a threat.52 This has 
serious implications for any attempt to introduce non executive directors. 
There are however Chinese corporations in south east Asia which have to some 
extent evolved beyond the concept of guanxi and developed non particularistic 
ties as a major factor in their business strategy, but they remain few and far 
between.53 Reliance on personal ties within and without the Chinese family firm 
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give it the special advantages that enable it to be so successful in the context 
and on the terms in which it operates. Networks of external personal 
relationships and an autocratic span of control within allow the Chinese family 
business to prosper and respond to challenges such as, for example, the need to 
retool with almost acrobatic flexibility. The other side of the coin, however, 
relates to limitations on the growth in size of the business and potential break 
up stresses. When an organisation begins to grow the Chinese capacity for 
mistrust “begins to weaken the seams in the fabric”.54 Companies do not cope 
well with the maintenance of control as they expand into new markets, new 
products and new technologies. In fact such challenges are often avoided and 
the vast majority of companies remain small.55 
As regards the issue of maintaining control and venturing into large scale 
operations Redding identifies two possibilities, particularly in the context of 
Hong Kong.56 One route is to graft on professional management and build a 
conglomerate. Strategic thinking may still be retained by family members, 
while divisional operations are left in the hands of professional managers. 
According to Redding the few conglomerates that have emerged tend to suffer 
from power disputes dividing the professionals and the owning entrepreneurial 
strategists. This type of large operation remains very much the exception 
remarkable for their rarity.57 
One company which might be regarded as an example of a relatively successful 
conglomerate is Hutchinson which is involved in property, shops and store 
chains such as “Watsons” and “Park and Shop” and general trading. The 
company was originally founded by a flamboyant Australian Douglas Clague.58 
In the business recession of 1974 Hong Kong Bank invested in the company 
and obtained equity control, showing Clague the door. After turning the 
company around, the bank sold its controlling share to Li Ka Shing. He is one 
of the few Hong Kong entrepreneurs recognised for an ability to trust and 
delegate to professional management. 
The alternative, more successful route is to choose a business or industry which 
has the following characteristics: 
• (a)   
large but relatively infrequent judgemental decisions, as for 
example in property; 
• (b)   
day to day operations which can be replicated using a standardised 
formula, and easily controlled or managed contractually, as for 
example in shipping or hotel management. 
• (c)   




In such a context to extend the influence of the key executive group or 
individual is much more feasible. Hong Kong examples of Chinese companies 
with these characteristics include Cheung Kong Holdings based on the skills of 
Mr Li Ka Shing and World Wide Shipping, based on the skills of the late Sir Y 
K Pao. 
At this point it is perhaps important to note the role of banks in the development 
of these larger businesses. Wong has dispelled the view that overseas Chinese 
businesses do not use banks as a source of finance.59 Simple pragmatism 
dictates that they will when appropriate and business historians have 
extensively documented these relationships.60 The Hong Kong Bank, in 
particular played an important role in the development of a number of Hong 
Kong businesses particularly in times of crisis as indicated in the Hutchinson 
example referred to above. Their equity investments were often used in some of 
the boardroom struggles and intercompany rivalries, especially where these 
allowed the bank to tip the scales in favour of Hong Kong Chinese 
entrepreneurs of proven ability (eg Sir Y K Pao and Li Ka Shing) at the expense 
of older British companies which appeared to have lost their way or become 
overstretched. In this sense the bank fulfilled a politico-sociological as well as a 
financial function. At one point the bank held a half of Pao's shipping 
companies and a fifth of Hutchinson Whampoa and Eastern Asia Navigation as 
well as a quarter of Cathay Pacific Airways and almost half of the South China 
Morning Post.61 Banks have therefore played an important if not crucial role in 
relatively recent times, by means of equity investments, in the development and 
survival of Hong Kong's larger listed companies. Similarly, in earlier periods, 
networking in Chinese business was strongly characterised by internal banking 
in the sense that the banker would enter into businesses as a partner, and that he 
would do so in a wide range of businesses in the search of good returns and in 
order to spread his risk.62 
 
Vertical Cooperation, Meetings and Management style: The Problem of 
Governance and Control 
One of the perceived weaknesses of the strong paternalistic Confucian style of 
management is the limitation of the strong vertical cooperation which gives 
strength on a small scale of operation but is a source of inefficiency and failure 
in the context of large size and growth. The key question is how far one 
person's decision making can be stretched. There are examples of Western and 
Japanese CEOs who have extensive influence throughout their corporations but 
it may be emphasised that they establish a system and a culture which expresses 
their policies, and then other people can make large decisions within that 
framework.63 In the context of the Hong Kong Chinese corporation the issue is 
the extent of the authority of the paternalistic controller, that person's decision 
making, his or her direct involvement. Successful large organisations have 
devised a formula for gearing up on the strategic intelligence of the dominant 
individual. Examples from shipping and property have been referred to above. 
In other spheres particularly product markets this is more difficult because a 
greater variety of factors need to be considered and in such circumstances, a 
one man decision making process will eventually lead to inadequately informed 
and late decisions leading to decline in the fortunes of the business. 
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Personalistic methods of control do have advantages in terms of internal 
transaction costs due to less paperwork and fewer formalities just as the 
external trust networks of personalistic social/business relationships lends to 
efficiency of transaction costs in economic exchanges. This is because 
transactions may be dealt with reliably and quickly by telephone or handshake 
or over dim sum whereas in a Western context they would require lawyers, 
contracts, guarantees, wide opinion seeking and investigation all accompanied 
by inevitable delay.64 Such an approach is mirrored in mainland China where 
foreign businessmen often complain bitterly about the delays associated with 
establishing such relationships and the shifting sands of Chinese negotiation 
tactics.65 
While in recent years delayering and re-engineering has eliminated much of 
middle management in listed corporations in the Western world, Chinese family 
controlled listed and unlisted corporations have relatively little middle 
management if only because management and strategic decisions are made at 
the highest levels of the corporation and executed by staff who report directly to 
the corporate “management person” (who will also often be CEO/MD) or 
management team. As a result these corporations rarely have retainers such as 
legal, accounting and marketing management save and except what may be 
characterised as support staff.66 
All of this has important implications for the role of meetings and the decision 
making process in governance structures. The Western format of the structured 
meeting with the occasional expression of differences of opinion is often 
viewed with anathema in a culture based on the avoidance of conflict, 
consensus and personalistic relations in the overall context of what is often an 
autocratic leadership or management system imbued with deference to 
authority.67 
A perusal of the annual reports of many listed companies in Hong Kong will 
reveal the extent to which a large number of such companies farm out their 
compliance work to service companies and individuals who provide company 
secretarial services.68 Several years ago the Carrian affair was the subject of 
criminal proceedings. During those proceedings one of the senior partners of a 
leading law firm gave evidence to the effect that his company secretarial staff 
would prepare minutes of Carrian Group company meetings in one of three 
ways. These were either by having someone present (which he admitted was 
rare); or by asking the directors to recount what was discussed and decided; or 
by using their sense of imagination.69 This is indicative of the local style where 
decisions are made and then lawyers etc approached where appropriate. I have 
discussed the technical and often disastrous legal consequences of such decision 
making elsewhere with graphic Hong Kong case examples.70 Suffice it to say 
that it is a reflection of the reality of the Hong Kong situation, namely that its 
corporate law regime is often little more than the formal clothing for, what in 
substance remains, essentially a familiar and personalistic Chinese organisation. 
In the view of one Western educated local management consultant, board 
meetings are hardly ever confrontational unless there is a serious breakdown in 
personal relationships. Where a difference of opinion on, for example, a 
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proposed course of action exists, the parties will simply state their positions. 
There is no attempt to openly debate and resolve a conflict. A compromise will 
be reached or decision made behind the scenes without an open loss of face 
which is potentially damaging for both sides.71 This is not very different from 
the situation in the boardrooms of many UK listed companies according to the 
work of Hill.72 The evidence there is similar. The majority of executive 
directors prefer not to disagree openly in public. Disagreements are voiced 
privately.A board meeting is a decision making event not a debate. Any debate 
will usually have taken place prior to the meeting. It is therefore most likely 
that any cultural differences will impact at that earlier stage. The greater power-
distance relationship in Hong Kong Chinese society and, for example, 
differences in humour will affect the extent to which dissent is expressed as 
well as the manner and force with which it is done.73  
Similar observations have been made in relation to the operation of boards of 
directors in Sino-Western joint ventures but with the importance of the impact 
of culture on this phenomenon emphasised. Björkman, notes that the risk of 
losing face, the tendency of the “superior” to talk for most of the time inhibiting 
input from directors and the need for permission from superiors before being 
able to support a board decision (which is difficult to obtain during a meeting) 
all militate against open debate and discussion in board meetings. Also, in the 
context of a joint venture, the trust and general relationship between the foreign 
partner and the Chinese is likely to deteriorate if they openly show that they 
have conflicting ideas. A failure to realise this on the part of the foreign partner 
has led to total deadlock at both board and operational level in the initial stages 
of several joint ventures. Later, several stages of consultation were adopted 
resulting in a smooth formal board meeting for which the minutes have often 
been written in advance.74 
The Hong Kong scenario of an avoidance of structured meetings and a 
preference for unscheduled, unstructured meetings, cultivating informal 
personal contacts therefore appears to be even more accentuated in studies of 
mainland Chinese enterprises. Stewart suggests that one reason for this is the 
limited experience and competence of mainland Chinese managers in the use of 
formal scheduled meetings: 
in the Western world schedule meetings as a communication 
medium have been fully developed and practised with sets of 
structured, formal and commonly accepted meeting procedures, 
and their actions in information dissemination and problem 
solving are well exploited. However, these procedures and 
functions are still somewhat lacking in China. Instead, the PRC 
managers tend to attach different values to attending scheduled 
meetings (cultivating interpersonal relationships, showing one's 
commitment, diligence and fishing for unsystematic 
information) but these aims are more easily achieved in 
unscheduled meetings.75 
The traditional approach and its value to mainland Chinese managers is also 
emphasised by Stewart: 
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the value of unscheduled meetings in the PRC is due to another 
factor. The importance of Guanxi, or personal connections, in 
China is well known … The unscheduled meetings provide ways 
in which to cultivate valuable interpersonal relationships more 
easily than during formal occasions. Most managers interviewed 
stressed the need to develop and maintain good working 
relationships with colleagues and environmental contacts: they 
saw this as the chief factor in their career success.76 
Child also makes similar and forceful points concerning the conduct of high 
level scheduled meetings in China: 
It is rare for such meetings to have a formal agenda or for papers 
to be presented to members in advance. Discussion defers very 
much to the most senior person present, who is generally more 
concerned to establish a climate of consensus around general 
principles or directions of policy than to raise specific issues. His 
or her approach looks to securing agreement on these general 
lines, which can then serve as the justification for arrangements 
and deals that are later struck through informal personal 
discussions. The outcome of these meetings is sometimes left so 
vague that it is not even clear what has been agreed. Normally, 
no minutes are taken though various clerks will take copious 
notes which are then filed away primarily to protect the heads of 
their departments or units should any dispute or criticism later 
arise. This means that follow up action has to be initiated 
personally by the senior manager and that the next meeting does 
not necessarily review progress on any systematic basis. It all 
reinforces the ever continuing need of Chinese senior managers, 
and directors in particular, to deal with matters on a personal 
basis.77 
Child goes on to pose the question whether Chinese senior managers' reluctance 
to delegate and their inclination to handle matters personally can be viewed as a 
response to the system of industrial governance within which they operate 
(particularly the power structure and informational environment), to the 
competencies at their disposal, or to their cultural context.78 It is reasonable to 
assume that the cultural characteristics discussed earlier will reinforce the 
hierarchical top down command structure that China's economy acquired under 
socialism and from which it is slowly retreating.79 
One might step back at this point and contrast the approach in the UK, for long 
the model of Hong Kong's Corporate legal regime and governance system. As 
Charkham points out, boards of UK quoted companies take meetings seriously 
and this is reflected by Hill.80 However, “any chairman can 'fix' the composition 
of the board or the agenda or the information or the meeting. It is no wonder 
that two boards with identical structures may be quite different in their 
effectiveness. It is the possibility of such extreme variation that underlines the 
importance of the role of the non executive directors and … requires the active 
vigilance of the shareholders.”81 Charkham's acid test of the effectiveness of 
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non executive directors is the “say 'No' test”.82 In the consensus and high 
power-distance context of Hong Kong Chinese firms this poses serious 
problems, but as Charkham points out the test is not as negative as it sounds 
because it is based on the important principle, in a Western context, of 
reciprocal respect. If a CEO and the board do not respect each other the system 
will not work as it should. Failing this acid test means that boards are not 
boards at all but merely advisory committees. This poses serious questions 
concerning the recent Hong Kong Stock Exchange introduction of a 
requirement for listed companies to appoint independent non executive 
directors. 
 
The cultural aspects of interlocking directorships and their impact on the 
introduction of non executive directors in Hong Kong 
I have briefly examined the introduction and role of independent non executive 
directors (NEDs) in Hong Kong in the context of directors' remuneration in an 
earlier volume of this journal.83 I now, wish to re-examine that issue 
emphasising the cultural aspects of interlocking directorships and the 
implications for independent NEDs in Hong Kong. 
The significance of interlocking directorships has been interpreted in the 
context of several models, each postulating distinct mechanisms and processes 
in the exercise of economic power. There are also a number of contending 
perspectives often associated with rival political positions.84 However, the 
fundamental question remains, irrespective of the perspective or position within 
which interlock researchers work, namely what does an interlocking 
directorship signify? Scott asserts that the majority of researchers have 
gradually come to realise that interlocks are most usefully treated as indicators 
of social relations.85 Given the importance of social and personal relations in 
the Hong Kong business context the introduction of independent NEDs was 
bound to meet with some resistance. 
In fact many listed companies had problems complying with the deadline. At an 
executive conference organised by HKICSA, Mr Keniel Wong a director of the 
HKSE listing division stated in his speech that as of 1 December 1994, one 
month before the deadline for the appointment of the second NED, 6 listed 
companies had not yet appointed their first NED and over 100 had not 
appointed their second. The deadline was subsequently extended by 3 months.86 
This is not surprising. The work of Gilbert Wong on interlocking directorships 
in Hong Kong demonstrates a distinctive interlocking behaviour in the nature of 
Chinese firms in Hong Kong. His research demonstrates that the ownership and 
control of the top 100 largest corporations in Hong Kong has actually become 
more concentrated and personalised in recent years and more of the boards were 
controlled by family members of the major shareholders. Many characteristics 
of the traditional small Chinese family firms were brought into large 
corporations which were once controlled by British owners and managements. 
Given the high degree of personalism in the management of Chinese family 
businesses, inter corporate relationships became more personal and informal. 
According to Wong, formal business networking ties in the form of outside 
directors appointed to created corporate interlocks, is not a major ingredient in 
15 
 
the Chinese business recipe. When Chinese business relationships are often 
based on personal trust it may well be regarded as an affront to the integrity of 
the businessmen concerned to force them to accept the Western method of 
using outside directors to safeguard investment interests. 
In this context of listed companies characterised by concentrated ownership 
relying on personalised trust and control the emphasis is on the use of multiple 
executive directorships. This fosters an inward orientation based an inter 
corporate relationships generally limited to the in group of businesses which are 
possessed of strong associations with each other based on ownership ties, 
family and other traditional linkages. According to Wong therefore: 
The intense and personal commitment of executive directors to 
the family firms also means that it would be unlikely for other 
business to invite them to serve as non executive directors. Their 
independence, in the context of the competitive environment of 
Hong Kong, would be questionable. In this situation, directorate 
linkages, if required at all, will be effected through outsiders 
who are not executives of either of the connected businesses. In 
consequence, executive and non executive directors take up 
different roles in the Chinese businesses and this leads to a 
sharper differentiation in the roles of the strong and weak ties in 
the interlocking directorates.87 
Wong emphasises the importance of the cultural factor in shaping business 
behaviour in Hong Kong and highlights the limitations of applying “Western” 
theoretical models straightforwardly in the Asian societal context. Therefore the 
configuration of directorates ties, must be explicated in the context of the social 
culture in which they are found irrespective of whether they follow resource 
interdependence, ownership, family relation or some other social and economic 
pathway. 
The emphasis in both the Cadbury and Bosch reports tends to be on the 
monitoring role of executive directors. A polarisation of attitudes between 
family executive directors and NEDs may well result from such an approach in 
the context of the Chinese family dominated listed company. As Redding 
observes: “The grafting on of new outsiders at a senior level in such 
organisations is particularly difficult, given the lengthy socialisation needed for 
understanding the organisation's core and often concealed features, but more 
particularly given the problem of time needed for the essential networking, not 
just outside but also inside the company.”88 Although NEDs are not executive 
managers or directors in the personalistic context of Hong Kong they must be, 
acceptable to the “governing” family and gain their trust. This will erode their 
independence and capacity to say “No”. Problems have emerged of access to 
information and the use of informal channels upsetting the delicate relationship 
of trust, confidence, and in the words of Charkham “reciprocal respect” that 
must exist between a managing director and the board. It has been reported that 
in one Hong Kong listed company non executive directors are allowed to see 
relevant papers at the start of board meetings and have them taken away at the 
end.89 This reflects the initial lack of trust which may well arise in the context 
of a Chinese family controlled listed company when they are forced to accept 
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relative outsiders. Yet issues of confidentiality if not secrecy are also of 
importance in the Western context. All directors whether executive, nominee 
executive or non executive, and independent NEDs owe a duty of 
confidentiality to the board and case law has confirmed this.90 Indeed the report 
of the UK Committee of Public Accounts on the role and responsibilities of 
nominee directors emphasised that nominee directors could not assist 
government departments and non departmental public bodies directly in the 
monitoring process, or pass confidential company information to them, without 
the prior agreement of companies or unless special arrangements such as 
contractual conditions of financial assistance permitted them to do so.91 
Perhaps the better approach to boards as whole, is that of the Hilmer 
Committee's “Strictly Boardroom”. That emphasises the theme that formal rules 
which are imposed on boards to ensure conformance with external 
requirements, must not be allowed to prevent directors from achieving the main 
goal which boards must serve. The boards key role is defined as ensuring that 
corporate management is continuously and effectively striving for above 
average performance taking account of risk.92 This does not deny the boards 
additional role with respect to shareholder protection. In relation to strategy and 
policy, Hilmer felt that the board of a large public company is an inappropriate 
body for developing strategy, setting corporate culture and policy and initiating 
major decisions. Instead the board should concentrate on the critical review of 
proposals, with management having the primary duty to formulate and then 
implement proposals.93 NEDs should concentrate on keeping the board's 
primary performance responsibility at the top of the agenda. Such an approach 
may be received more positively in Hong Kong and would certainly leave the 
controlling family heads free to devise strategy and policy. The problem of 
allowing that strategy to be reviewed by relative outsiders would however 
remain difficult to surmount. 
Non executive directors have recently played a key role in the removal of 
members of a founding family from the board of a listed property developer, 
Keng Fong Sin Kee Construction & Investment Co after perceived abuses on 
their part. The managing director was quoted as saying “Having two 
independent non executive directors on the board is the best thing the stock 
exchange has done in the market”. In that case it was other members of the 
extended family which voted the directors out of office. Where the situation is 
one of a united controlling family versus the investing public the task of NEDs 
may not be so easy.94 
One issue which over time may prove of significance is the increase in and 
demand for well educated and professionally trained managers.In recent years 
Hong Kong has expanded its tertiary education sector and courses in business 
studies and related fields have mushroomed in response to a high level of 
demand.95 Much the same has happened in the context of legal studies. A 
similar phenomenon has occurred in China with the demand for trained 
management not only in the state sector but in the ever increasing number of 
joint venture projects in China. A large number of mainland Chinese are 
increasingly opting for business and management studies particularly in the 
USA.96 The extent to which this will influence business, management and to 
some extent corporate governance practices in future remains to be seen. One 
17 
 
important aspect is the cross cultural influence of joint ventures in both Hong 
Kong and China. I will now turn to a brief consideration of this issue. 
 
The impact of joint ventures on management and governance style 
There are many examples in Hong Kong of equity joint ventures between 
Western companies, with a desire to manufacture and sell in Southeast Asia 
Region and local Chinese companies with extensive distribution networks 
throughout the region.97 Mainland China has also encouraged the growth of 
numerous joint ventures with Western, Japanese, Hong Kong and Taiwanese 
business in its bid to develop its economy. Indeed, the development of China 
Post 1979 owes much to the overseas Chinese Diaspora. 
In both contexts, as explained above, the Hong Kong and Chinese manager has 
been imbued with a different system of management norms which are even 
more marked in the mainland Chinese context because of the political economic 
system. As Child points out, in the mainland context these differences create 
problems of mutual comprehension and present both sides with the need for 
considerable adjustment and learning.98 Joint ventures also have other 
problems. They are often regarded as second best compared to wholly owned 
subsidiaries because of concern over the limits to the control that a parent 
company can exercise.As Schaan points out, they have all the control problems 
of subsidiaries plus those which arise from joint ownership.99 But in the context 
of South East Asia and China the need to tap into the existing personalistic 
business networks of a joint venture partner is immediate, for otherwise a 
Western company may spend years building up the same trust relationships and 
a competitor who taps into those of a joint venture partner has a considerable 
advantage. According to Child both partners are bringing complementary 
strengths to the joint ventures. In order to realise these an agreed basis of 
cooperation must be found. Even the holding of a majority equity position 
cannot be used to enforce control over the venture without jeopardising the 
basis for its success. Therefore some limitation of control is the price to be paid 
for securing the advantages of a joint venture.100 
The evidence from joint ventures on changes in management and boardroom 
practices introduced by foreign parties identifies the different approaches of the 
various foreign partners and discerns the modes by which foreign and Chinese 
managers relate and adjust to each other. Some of these have already been 
referred to in the context of board meetings.101 
American and European companies tend to introduce formalised systems for 
transmitting key information and for defining the framework of managerial 
authority and responsibility. This helps to clarify managerial roles and 
obligations while at the same time establishing a framework within which 
operational decisions could potentially be delegated and responsibility for those 
decisions be clearly identified.102 When this is combined with substantial 
management training programmes evidence from longer established joint 
ventures suggests that after a while local managers, at least on the mainland, 
develop to the point where the foreign partner is confident about delegating 
responsibility to them. However, in this context it is important to note that the 
18 
 
American joint ventures in particular tended to recruit the most highly educated 
workforce.103 
Formalisation is found to be much less developed in the Japanese and Hong 
Kong partnered ventures. The approach among the latter was to control through 
personal intervention while the Japanese, as one Japanese vice chairman of a 
Shanghai venture put it, “want to change their minds”. They attempt, not 
wholly successfully, to fashion Chinese work behaviour through creating 
organisational cultures with strong collective norms.104 American joint venture 
partners tend also to push for change more aggressively, but do not require so 
much a re-culturalisation as an understanding of how to conduct business and to 
use the modern techniques associated with this although they sometimes fail to 
give their local colleagues much opportunity to get involved in the strategic 
process.105 In this context, however, it is important to note Child's point that 
when Chinese managers hold a different orientation this is not necessary born 
out of a poor strategic understanding but is rather founded upon a realistic 
perception of different interests between partners: it is inextricably bound up 
with the issue of control.106 
 A second issue becomes relevant here namely that when “forced” to adopt new 
methods or practices the behaviour of the Chinese may be modified but the 
reasoning behind the changes they are obliged to accept is not internalised.107 
The extent to which Western organisational norms influence behaviour, 
particularly in relation to the issue of open discussions, delegation and 
questions of control is debatable. With the advent of organisational behaviour 
texts which emphasise the South East Asian context the cultural tendencies of 
managers and directors of future Hong Kong companies are arguably being 
reinforced rather than diluted by Western style training.108 The cultural 
implications for the internal organisation and style of corporate governance of 
Chinese family controlled businesses remains therefore an important part of the 
equation which, if ignored in any corporate law reform, will be ignored at the 
peril of that reforms success including any reform relating to securities markets, 
control and accountability and transparency. With this in mind I now wish to 
explore some cultural aspects and Wong Sui Lin's Model of the Chinese family 
firm, its life cycle and the possible separation of ownership and control. 
 
Some cultural and psychological insights 
The importance of “national” cultural traits and their impact on organisational 
behaviour has been emphasised by the work, inter alia, of Hofstede109 and more 
recently Trompenaars.110 I will refer briefly to some of the factors identified by 
these and other writers which may prove relevant to the corporate governance 
issues as well as the expanding research in the field of Chinese psychology. The 
two elements which I wish to draw attention to here are those of power distance 
and uncertainty avoidance. 
Although there are some similarities between British social hierarchies and 
those of the Hong Kong Chinese one major difference is in their“power 
distance score”.111 According to some writers there is little remaining today 
beyond lip service to Confucian thought in Chinese behaviour except in 
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hierarchial authority and power.112 According to Hofstede and Trompenaars the 
Chinese (including Hong Kong) have a much higher power distance score than 
the British. In large power distance countries there is considerable dependence 
by subordinates on bosses. The response of subordinates is either to prefer an 
autocratic or paternalistic boss ie accepting or preferring dependence, or to 
reject it entirely. The latter is called counterdependance (in psychology a form 
of dependence with a negative sign). In both cases, the emotional distance 
between bosses and their subordinates is large: subordinates are unlikely to 
approach and contradict their bosses directly. This factor when combined with 
the other cultural elements referred to earlier has a significant impact on 
decision making, for example, within the cultural context of high power 
distance, Chinese managers are likely to spend much more of their time with 
their superiors and much less of it with outsiders and their peers than say 
American or British managers.113  
It is likely that Chinese directors/managers give more orders and spend more 
time checking on their implementation than do their Western counterparts. 
Similarly, making short term decisions involves senior directors/managers 
much more in China than it does for example in the UK, whereas in the case of 
long term decisions, the pattern is often reversed. Substantially different results 
have been observed in different economic sectors for example manufacturing as 
compared to service industries. This underlines many findings that effective 
leadership behaviours are not dependant solely on cultural issues, but are driven 
by an interaction between culture and the logic of each organisation's 
commercial and political environment.114 To the latter might be added its legal 
and regulatory regime. There are, of course, numerous other aspects of a large 
power distance factor and its impact and interaction with other elements both 
cultural and non cultural. In particular the interaction with “in group” (including 
the family) and “out group” relationships, assertiveness115 and decision making 
in high and low risk contexts.116 
A lower uncertainty avoidance score for Hong Kong and Singapore Chinese is 
in some aspects difficult to explain.117 The scores for Taiwan for example are 
much higher.118 But both the British and Hong Kong scores are relatively low. 
This ability to accept and deal with ambiguity in both cultures may provide 
some answers for the successful adoption of the UK corporate form in Hong 
Kong. 
A corporation is no less an invention than a steam engine. It is an institutional 
invention developed in a particular historical and cultural context. Therefore, it 
may take considerably more time for businessmen from another culture to 
appreciate its advantages whereas those of a steam engine are more obvious.119 
According to Faure, the Chinese have their own very clear ideas of corporations 
which are described by a wide range of terms for which translation is often at 
best approximate. Nevertheless, the Chinese concept, whether voluntary or not 
gave the appearance that its existence extended beyond the individual and 
allowed for the illusion that property rights could be maintained for generations 
if not perpetuity.120 However, by the latter part of the nineteenth century 
merchants conducting business on the China coast and South East Asia were 
served in part by sophisticated institution that had their origins outside China 
particularly Western banks, shipping and insurance companies.121 Over the 
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years that followed and increasingly after the second world war those 
institutions were used by the Hong Kong Chinese merchants themselves but 
adopted to the context of their business culture.122 That context was the Chinese 
family firm with its extended business networks. 
 
The Chinese family firm and its lifecycle 
According to Wong in order to understand the characteristics of a Chinese 
family firm it is important to identify the stage of its development and the social 
dynamics involved at each stage.123 He identifies four important stages, the 
emergent, centralised, segmented and disintegrative. The emergent stage may 
be bypassed where an entrepreneur has sufficient capital, but as Wong points 
out many corporate businesses, eg textiles and banks, do not start simply as a 
family concern “because it is unlikely that the funds mastered by an individual 
and his jia (family estate) alone are sufficient to set up an enterprise other than a 
very modest one”.124 Where “partnerships” are used albeit in corporate form 
jockeying for control will occur and an asymmetrical growth in the distribution 
of shares. Similar evidence is provided by Suehiro in relation to Chinese firms 
in Thailand125 and by Hattori in relation to family control of Chaebol in 
Korea.126  
Eventually, a shareholder and his jia ultimately attain majority ownership. In 
the centralised stage, the managerial and structural aspects of which have been 
considered earlier, profits are often used to finance expansion which may also 
include transfer of assets from one line of business to another for lateral 
expansion and mutual sustenance. Capital is mobile within the family group of 
businesses because it belongs to a common unified family budget. Although the 
father entrepreneur has absolute authority in utilising the capital of the family 
firm it is not his person property. He is almost, in Western terms, a trustee of 
the family estate which belongs to his children. The more he enriches that 
endowment the greater his social recognition. This can often lead to a tug of 
war between the father entrepreneur and sons inheritors which usually drags on 
while the father tries to contain the centripetal tendency of his sons and 
maintain his social recognition.127 
After the demise of the father entrepreneur the firm enters the segmented stage. 
Unlike land which must be divided equally between inheritors a business is 
more amenable to surviving intact in the later phases of the centralised stage 
and early phases of the segmented stage because profits can be shared. Also the 
typical restrictions in a private company's constitution on the transfer of shares 
such as a pre-emption clause or directors' discretion to register transferee as 
members help to contain the business intact as a family business. The likelihood 
of splintering the estate of the family firm at this stage is not great.128 
The situation as regards management and control is however different. Brothers 
may attempt to foster their own distinct spheres of influence and consensus 
among them cannot be taken for granted which curtails the power of the chief 
executive. This in turn gives rise to characteristics of outward expansion of the 
enterprise owing to segmentation, and a reduction in the flexibility for 
reinvestment and risk taking as the CEO increasingly takes on the role of 
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caretaker of the family estate instead of innovator. There is some similarity with 
the emergent stage and one of the brothers, if not the CEO, may take over the 
business securing control for his family unit or fang. Otherwise there is an 
increasing tendency to split.129 The latter is accentuated in the third 
“disintegrative” stage. Brothers' sons, ie first cousins have more divergent 
interests because unlike their fathers, who begin on an equal footing as regards 
inheritance of shares in the family company, they will not have equal shares 
because of different fertility among various fang. This third generation situation 
leads to less identification with the original family business for economic and 
personal reasons and therefore to a greater potential for fission.130 Redding has 
also emphasised that even at this stage there is unwillingness to rely on outside 
professional management.131 
Before leaving the life cycle of the Chinese family firm one other sociological 
element needs to be considered which is not dealt with directly by either Wong 
or Redding. The stages in the development of the Chinese family firm may well 
be mirrored in Western firms. The case law on minority shareholder protection 
in the UK has many examples of breakdowns in relationships between partners, 
eg Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd132 and Re Cummana133and between fathers and 
sons as in Re H R Harmer Ltd134 or even brothers or other inheritors of the 
family business such as Re Cuthbert Cooper Ltd135 and Clemens v Clemens & 
Sons Ltd.136 But in the context of the Chinese family firm and the important 
role of the family estate the concubine or second and even third wife can, and 
often does have, an additional disintegrative effect, just as extended 
polygamous business families also have inherent strengths.137 
Many wealthier, and some not so wealthy, Chinese businessman take several 
wives or concubines. The practice of taking more than one wife was made 
illegal in Hong Kong in 1971.138 That does not stop the practice continuing on a 
more informal basis. One current social problem in Hong Kong is the practice, 
for example, of taking a second wife or mistress on the mainland by the 
increasing number of businessmen and managers or lorry drivers who spend a 
significant amount of their working time there.139 
Concubinage was fairly well sanctioned in Chinese culture by the need to have 
male descendants.140 The practice often led to greater opportunity for discord 
and disjunctions. The acquisition of concubines as an outlet for sexual desires 
and a source of affectional response gave concubines the opportunity to take 
advantage of their primacy in the affection of the husband.141 They could 
exercise considerable informal power in the family; so much so that one late 
Ming dynasty lineage rules from the Miu lineage in Guangdong province had 
the following to say on the matter: 
Taking concubines in order to beget heirs should be a last resort, 
for the sons of the legal wife and the sons of the concubine are 
never of one mind, causing innumerable conflicts between half 
brothers. If the parents are in the least partial, problems will 
multiply, creating misfortunes in later generations. Since 




This has been reflected in some recent case law in Hong Kong where the sons 
of the first wife have attempted to disinherit the children of concubines.143 
Similarly, although Hong Kong's minority shareholder law is very similar to 
that of the UK's there are relatively few minority shareholder cases which get to 
court, either at an interlocutory stage or for a full hearing.144 Many more writs 
are however issued.145 These are currently under investigation by a research 
project in my department which, although in its early stages, does indicate that 
splits in Chinese family businesses often involve disputes between concubines 
and their children on the one hand and the children of the first wife on the other, 
often at the segmented stage of a family business' development. One Barrister 
for example, who had dealt with seven such cases in the last four years, all of 
which settled out of court, confirmed that in two of them the disputes involved 
concubine scenarios. 
One case which did get to court is Re Shiu Fook Ltd.146 In that case a concubine 
argued for just and equitable winding up on the basis of deadlock with the son 
of the first wife. There was evidence that she desired to emigrate to Australia 
and take part of the family estate with her. She failed to establish deadlock on 
the facts or that she had acted reasonably in not pursuing alternative remedies 
such as appointing more impartial directors, offering to sell her shares or 
pursuing an unfair prejudice remedy. The court emphasised the nature of the 
family business as part of the family estate and the inappropriateness of the 
remedy sought in the circumstances. 
The factor of polygamy is clearly an important element which has to be taken 
into account in any model of the Chinese family firm because it affects the 
dynamics of the relationships between mother and sons and groups of syblings. 
These are some of the factors which Wong has recently considered but without 
reference to polygamy.147 Although this practice may be on the decline in Hong 
Kong it is clearly alive and well elsewhere, such as Thailand.148 But the effects 
of these relationship is felt today both in the success of “interrelated” networks 
of associated companies driven by a desire to maintain and increase their family 
wealth and the occasional disintegration of companies or their controlling 
constellations of shareholders when extended polygamous family relationships 
break down. 
In the UK context Charkham emphasises the double ancestry of listed 
companies. One type the classic joint stock company had separation of 
ownership and control from its very inception. The other is the registered 
company which after Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd149 was often used as a 
family business vehicle with owner managers. According to Charkham: 
Such businesses often stayed private for a long while, and either 
died150 or were absorbed. Of the successful a relative few were 
floated later; even so, they retained most of the characteristics of 
the family business with few if any outsiders on the board. Many 
of them, if truth be told, made the transition without changing 
habits, in the mistaken belief that it was they, the proprietors, 
who were conferring a favour on those who subscribe for some 
shares in their business, an error which occasionally persists.151 
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This double ancestry is reflected in the way people think about boards and the 
role of directors. A world of difference exists between a committee of owner 
managers in a private company (and by analogy a Chinese family dominated 
HKSE listed company) and a board of a great public company on which no one 
owns a significant shareholding. The question is whether it is appropriate to use 
the same legal and/or corporate governance regime for both. 
 
Conclusion 
In some ways the Chinese family corporation may be likened to a jungle in 
which firms live and die relatively rapidly or split into smaller 
organisms.“Plants die but the Jungle keeps going on”. The underlying 
fundamental elements of its inner core are unstable at a larger scale and in the 
second or third generations. The holistic way in which the family estate is 
inextricably identified as the corporate business renders regulation and 
governance problematic, even more so as the legitimacy of the power structure 
breaks down over time, without modern management structures or personnel to 
bridge the gap. 
Hwang has argued, in a view markedly different from that of Redding, that a 
fragmentation of family business is not the only future that can be imagined. 
While Confucian family centred work values may guide small businesses, there 
are other long established systems of values upon which managers of expanding 
businesses may rely. Legalisation is identified as such a system which he 
defines in terms of the rights of the individual and equitable reward for 
individual effort. He concludes from his study of Taiwanese organisations that 
Chinese organisations become more effective only as they move away from 
structures reliant upon traditional Confucian values and toward structures based 
upon a more overt rationality.152 There is also considerable evidence in the 
early development of the overseas Chinese Kongsi of an attempt to develop a 
kind of civil society with elected officials and other institutions when Chinese 
businessmen were without state and family.153 
The HKSE and SFC will have to tread carefully, lest many more companies, 
tiring of what is often perceived as an increasingly alien and intrusive 
regulatory regime, opt for privatisation.154 That is not to say that they should be 
less rigorous in enforcement but rather more subtle. Introducing the 
independent NED regime was an interesting development, particularly in the 
light of the sometimes easy going enforcement of the listing rules combined 
with the occasional cat and mouse game with those companies who are 
reluctant to comply. Herbet Hui's recent public statement that he was 
considering beefing up the guidelines on directors' resignation announcements 
to make the reasons for withdrawal from the boards of listed companies public 
was just one example of this.155 But the whole scenario is indicative of the 
underlying problems outlined in this paper. Hong Kong has its corporate 
cowboys156 and directors who attempt to pay themselves excessive 
remuneration157 or bigger listed companies by selling assets to them at huge 
overvalues158 as do other economies to a greater or lesser extent. Secrecy is 
endemic and the Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance 1988 has only 
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chipped away at the surface since non director substantial shareholders do not 
have to make disclosure in respect of shares held under a discretionary trust 
which becomes a new instrument in maintaining family cohesion in the 
centralised and early segmented stages of a family firm's life. 
Hong Kong does not have the luxury like the UK, of a real dual root to the 
origins of its listed companies, except for a few examples like Hong Kong 
Bank, the majority of its listed companies commenced life as private companies 
(discounting the recent listing of mainland enterprises). Not just private 
companies but Chinese family firms. As listed companies they are potentially 
unstable within a few years or generations of the founder's death. The problems 
of boards and governance are more acute. A legal and corporate governance 
regime needs to be explored which readily allows a synthesis of the strategic 
options available to such firms for longer term survival, namely, a series of 
strategic alliances with Japanese or Western companies with advanced 
technology and international brand names or alternatively the slow but sure 
rationalisation, professionalisation and bureaucratisation of control with the 
professional staff to make it work. 
As Faure has recently put it: 
Established for the purpose of business, the enterprise can break 
away from family ownership and management, even though it 
does not always do so. Where it intersects with the financial 
market, however, the demands of the financial market tend to 
leave their marks on the business: the market demands 
accountability of the chief executive and some transparency in 
their managerial decisions. These demands do not mean that the 
chief executive cannot pass his position to his offspring, but it 
does mean that even if he does, his offspring no longer runs an 
enterprise that portrays itself as a family.159 
But even if this is the case the factors outlined in this paper indicate that there 
are important differences in cultural outlook and expectations which affect the 
local response to the regulatory regime. 
In the forthcoming review of Hong Kong's corporate law regime Ermano 
Pascutto proposes to draw upon a variety of corporate law models, mostly 
common law based, for the purpose of determining a Companies Ordinance for 
the 21st century. In his inception report Pascutto emphasises that the UK model 
of corporate law, often the inspiration for Hong Kong's regime, may not be the 
way of the future. He quotes Gower:160 
The major questions still unresolved, and likely to remain 
unresolved, can really be reduced to one: Has our system of 
Company Law (evolved in the 19th Century) adapted itself 
adequately to the needs of the 20th and the likely challenges of 
the 21st. To suggest that it has not, may seem churlish … (O)ur 
system of Company Law was, until recently, the model widely 
followed in the Common Law countries. That leading role has 
now been taken over by the United States (influencing Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) and we cannot hope to recover it. 
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Pascutto's inception report goes on to emphasise the influence of the United 
States and in recent times that of the Canadian system on recent reforms in New 
Zealand. Australian legislation is dismissed for its complexity and its failure to 
clearly distinguish between securities law matters and company law. It is 
regarded as “outdated and dense in form”.161 Australian corporate legislation is 
currently going through a process of simplification. In regard to the Asian 
context the inception report states: 
In conducting the review, reference should be had to the 
commercial and economic context in which the Companies 
Ordinance operates. Developments in companies legislation in 
other parts of Asia (where similar economic forces are at work) 
could be instructive. For example, Singapore and Malaysia 
currently have legislation in place modelled on the UK 
Companies Act 1948 and the Australian Uniform Companies 
Act 1961. Any plans for reform of these statutes would be of 
interest. Finally, any review of the Companies Ordinance must 
be done with an awareness of the recently enacted Company 
Law of the People's Republic of China.162 
This, with respect, emphasises economic forces and fails to give due weight to, 
inter alia, the role of culture in the organisation, structure and management of 
Hong Kong companies. It is submitted that this is a serious oversight. 
 
GIHKJLJNM$OP QSRUT-VXW MSY	TSJLJNMWM$Y[Z\QS]_^X`[P RUa-bc?P dXTeW JP RUa_MSY[f?McNgihMcNg
jkml5n







M$Te^SoXVqMt P RNP OLQetNQecNZ\TSg?Qet
n









QecNQSg$TeW JBTSQe"]_cNTW J1uvNTVsMt P RNP OLQet
n
M$M$RUJMSYHpwxTeW\P OLQec
































`[vNQeW\SvNQewB^[hTSTey?P cNgiM$MS-`MwByNQecaeH£RNN?a"MSY[`KMWzyNMeW QSRUT"MSdSTeW\cNQecNONT P ci{XP dST"`M$cNRNW\P TSJ^













¦uv?P J¦deP TS]_yMP cNR3JLTSTesJ¦RUM TX¤ey?t QeP c5RNvNT§gW MS][RNv5QecNJLRNW TecNg?RNv5M$YŁY	QewBP t a¨?JP cNTSJLJ£P c5HKJ?P Q¨Na
Y	M$ONJP cNgMc¦Y	QewBP t a§JLRNW\NOLRN?W T§QecN£QSY	YsP t P QSRNP Mc£cNTSRU][MeW\sJ
Ł©
R3My?yM$JNTSJ9RNvNT ª MP cNR«JLRUM$O?ONMewByNQecNa
OLMcNRNW MtiOLMcNONTeyNR¬} ]_v?P Ov,y?W TXJ?wTSJ­Qt P cNTSQeW£RUayNT®gW M$]pRNv¬QecN¯TS¤yNQecNJP Mc°M$Y¡TecNRUTW\y$W\P JLT
MW g?Qec?P JLQSRNP Mc

P cNJP JLRNP cNgŁRLvNQSRRNvLTY	QewBP t a-?NJP cNTSJLJP JcM$RQecITSQeW\t aOLQey?P RUQet P JLRIwQecNQSg?TewTecNRY MWzwRNvNQSR
]_P t t[cNTSOLTSJLJLQeW\P t a5]_P RNvNTeWIQS][QXaP c"RNvNT£wBP ?JLR_M$YflRNvNT¦QX?dSQecNOLT5M$YflQwMS?TeW\c"ª MP cNR_JLRUM$O?«ONMewByNQecNa
JLaSJLRUTew&?NR1RNvNQSR1RNvNT5HffJP Qec?^yQeW RNP O?t QeW\t a5RNvNT`[v?P cNTSJLTY	QewBP t a ?NJP cNTSJLJ^vNQXJ"Q W QSRNP McNQet P RUaQet tpP RUJ
M$]_c?«OLY"H&KNTev?P W M^_o{qQewBP t a²±KNJP cNTSJLJ
n
TSQXJLJLTSJNJLTS«`KMWzyMW QSRUT³RW\NOLRN?W T¡QecN°Z\QSRUT³R´QeW RNP cNg
©











































QeyNQecNTSJLThKP TW TSRUJ?edSTW\t QeyNJ«±TSRU]pTSTec`MeW\yMW QSR´T
M$dXTeW\cNQecNOLT_QecN
©











































N$][QeW ?J1Qec¦h-{XP JLOvNTW\^±Qec?sJ^{XP cNQecNOLTŁQecN
©




H§cNTS]ºt QS]rvNQSJ"W TSOLTecNRNt a¦TSTec¼y?W MyM$JLTX¼]_v?P Ov1]_P t tXTet P wBP cNQSRUT«TeW\wQec"±Qec$sJ½KwM$JLR
yNM$]pTeW Ys?t][TSQeyMcQSROLMwByNQec?P TSJ½Qec?c?NQetg?TecNTeW QetwTSTSRNP cNg?J[RNvNTeP W1W\P gvNRRUMOLQSJLRy?W M$¤Sa-dSM$R´TSJ3Y	MeW
M$RNvNTeW-P cNdSTSJLR´MW J¦]_vNM$JLT JvNQW TXJ9RNvNTSaºwQecNQSg?T
©
c¦YsNRN?W Te^TeW\wQec£NQec$sTeW J9]_P t tflcNTSTS£TX¤ey?t P OP R
OLMcNJLTecNRYqW Mw/Ot P TecNRUJRUMBdSM$RUTRvNTeP WffJvNQeW TSJ^ewQSP cNgP RIvNQeW ?TWffY	MeWffRNvNTewRUMiNJLTRNvNT-y$W MS¤eP TSJY MeWffRNvNTeP W
M$]_cTecN?J^XJLTST_o±Qec?sJIQecN
©































²ZŁMcNg^o·`[v?P cNTSJLT¾?cNRNW Tey$W TecNTe$W J QecN°±KNJP cNTSJNJ uW\NJLR|q^-±KNJ?P cNTSJLJ
¸?TSRU][MeW\sJ«QecN£NONMcNMwBP O¦TSdXTet My?wTecNR«P c¦NQSJLRflQecNMNRNvNTSQSJLRflHKJP Qe^TS5 f?QewBP t RUMc?^`TecRNW TMSY
HKJP Qec9RNNP TSJ9bc?P dSTW JP RUaM$Yf$McNgmhMcg^
jN~?~j











































TXT5g?TecNTW Qet t a«ZŁMcNg^







?cNRNW Tey?W TecNTe?W JIQecNi?cNRUTeW\y$W\P JLTSJŁP c
k




uvNT9TXdeP ?TecNONT9RNvNQSRRNvNTmwxQecNQSg?TeW\P QeteRNvNTSJP J-M$YflQ9JNTeyNQW QSRNP Mc-MSY1MS]_cNTW Jv?P y-QecN ONMcNRNW MtQSJiQ
OLMWzyNMeW QSRNP McgW MS][JflQy?y?t P TSJflR´M^$Y	MeWTX¤SQewBy?t Ti±KW\P RUQeP cQecN3RNvNTbeHp^P JflQSRTSJLRRUTecN?TecNRNP MNJ^$OLMecNRNW QSJLR























P c¼W Tet QSRNP Mc1RUM
RNvNT bH









VONM$RURN^oq`KMWzyNMeW QSRUT`McNRNW MtffQecN¦`KMeW\yMW QSRUT
n
?t TeB±ffW\P RUQeP c¦P c«Qec
©





























































W TSgP JLRW QSRNP MciMSY_ONMwByNQec?P TSJ$W\P cNgRNvNT
l
QeyNQecNTSJNT9M$OLO$yNQSRNP Mc











P RNvMc?t a¼Q¼OLM?y?t T¼M$YpTS¤XOLTeyNRNP McNJ^KQet tSOLMwByNQec?P TSJBMcRNvNT9t P JLRxQeW T¼`[v?P cNTSJLT9?NJP cNTSJLJLTSJ^pNM$RNv
wQecNQSg?TSŁQecNŁMS]_cNTSiNa`[v?P cNTXJLT






W TSgP JLRW QSRNP McBOLMcNJLRNP RNNRUTSJŁRNvNT"Mc?t a"J?W deP deP cNg-YsP W\w¾t TSdSTet$?QSRUQ"Y	MWRNvNT f?McNg/hMcNg









P JLTŁMSY±KNJP cNTXJLJ1`KMeW\yMW QSRNP McNJ«P cfl`[v?P cNQYqW Mw
k
P cNg






















?NJP cNTSJLJNTSJºW TXgP JLRUTeW TX­?cN?TW¼RNvNT
n
TSgP JLRNW QSRNP Mec MSY






W TSgP JLRUTW TXBOLMwByNQec?P TSJ

jL~









P R¼?cN?TeW ][TecNR1J?NJLRUQecNRNP Qetp?yN?QSRNP cNg9]_v?P Ov9vNQSJ"OLMcNRNP c?NTS9Mc¼Qec¼Qet wMSJLR1Qec?c?NQet
NQSJP J_JP cNOLT

KP wBP t QeW\t a3RNvNT5f?McNg9hMcNg9TSO$W\P RNP TSJ_flW P cNQecNOLT5NTSQeW J_Q5W TewQeWzsQe?t T5W TSJLTew?t QcNOLT3RUM






















?]pTeW TOLMwyNQec?P TSJ3t P wBP RUTSNagNQW QecNRUTSTe`KMwByNQecNa
n




























y$W\P dSQSRUTOLMewByNQec?P TSJ1McflRNvNTW TSgP JLRUTeW\`KMwyNQecNa
n























t P JLRUTS3OLMwyNQec?P TSJ^





















uv?P J5P J5cNM$RRUMJLQSaiRNvNQSRRNvLTioqOLMcNRNW QSOLR|xRNvNTwM$JLROLMwBwxMcY	MeW\w¨MSYB?NJP cNTSJLJ5P cNJLRNP RNNRNP Mc][QSJ
?c?ScNM$]_cP cŁ`[v?P cNQe^Á?P RUT-RLvNTiOLMcNRNW QeW a-Y MWRNvNT-OLMwBwxMcNJLT-M$YxOLMcNRNW QSOLRUJ^xP ct QecNRNW QecNJLY	TeWQecN
yNQeW RNcNTeW Jv?P y3QSgW TXTewTecNRUJ«JNg?g$TSJLRUJ«RNvNQSROLMcNRNW QSOLRUJ«][TeW T]_P $Tet a§NJLTS^I{qQe?W Te^oq`Qey?P RUQet P JwºQecN
RNvNTmfP JLRUMW a¦M$Y1`[v?P cNTSJNTm±KNJP cNTSJLJ|q^1y$W TSJNTecNRUTS/QSRuvNT
n
P JNT9M$Y¼±KNJP cNTSJNJi`KMWzyNMeW QSRNP McNJP c-`[v?P cNQ
{XW Mw
k






























9{qQe$W Te^?oquvNTZP cNTSQSg?TŁQXJ«±KNJP cNTSJLJfl`KMwByNQecaexVsQSRNW McNQSg$T
À
























uvNT"W Mt TMSYeHffJP QecŁW Tet P gP McBW Tey?W TSJLTecNRNP cNgŁONMW T_JLMSOP TSRUQetNdSQet NTSJy?t QSaXTSŁQ_OLTecNRNW Qet?W Mt T-P cITSONMecNMwBP O
?TSdXTet My?wxTecNR

{·MWŁTeTeWRNvNT¡oqRUTecNJP Mc$|9TSRU][TSTecW Tet P gP MNJ¨P ?TSQet J§Qec°y$W QSOLRNP OLQetW TSQet P RUa¡][QXJ
P wByNMW RUQecNR
I©
RUJ¼OLQyNQSOP RUaR´M5TX¤y?t QeP c«]_vNaJLMwTO?t RN?W TSJ«JLRNW\P dSTR´M5OvNQecNg?TRNvNT][MeW\t ¦QecNM$RNvNTeW J





yNQeW RNP O?t QeW\t a)][QXJQet tQeNMNRO?vNQecNg?T)QecNºOLMcNRW Mt ^B]_vNTW TSQSJ `McNYsNOP Qec?P Jw,][QSJQet tQeNMRRNvNT



















































{qMeWffQ-yNMSJP RNP dSTdeP TS] QecNŁTX¤XQewBy?t TSJMSYeRNvNT-P cNYst NTecNOLTM$Ye`KMecNYsNOP Qec?P JwB^STS¤ey?W TSJLJLTXP cIRNvNTY	MW\w/M$Y










} uW QSP RNP McNQetS`[v?P cNTSJLT9NRNv?P OLJBQecL
n












Y	MeWQec¼P t t LJLRNW QSRNP Mc1M$YRNvNT3RUMcNg?¤eP QecNg9y?vNTcNMwTecNMc¼P c1RNvNT3RNW QSP RNP McNQet`[vP cNTSJLT















flcRNvNT_gW M?cBRNvNQSRIP YRU][M-yNTeW JLMcNJŁvNQSdST_RNvNT_JLQewT_J?W\cNQwTe^XRNvNTSa"wQSa"NT_?TSJLONTecN?QecNRUJM$YRNvNT
JLQewTQecNONTSJLRUMeW

Ł{qMeWffQONMcNJP ?TW QSRNP McIMSYeRNv?P Jy?vNTecNMwTecMcŁP cIRNvNTOLMcNRUTS¤SRMSYRNvNTTecNY	MeW OLTewxTecNRM$YY	MeW TeP gcIQWz?P RNW Qet






cYst NTecNOLT-MSYxuW QSP RNP McNQet
k
MW Qet P RUa-MecŁRNvNT















cNRUTW QSOLRNP Mc?f?QeW\wMcNa¼QecN/fP TeW QW O?vNa¼Mc










































ŁQecNg^poq`[v?P cNTSJLT£Z\TSQS$TeW Jv?P y-QecN














McNTXJ^Łoq`Qey?P RUQet P JwB^Łt MNQet P JLQSRNP McQecN
n
?t T¨M$Y§Z\QX]_-Hpc







oqP Y	RUJ^±KW\P TSJ¼QecN¦NQecN¤eP Q
n









uSMwQSJP O^poq`MwyNQecNamZ\QS]¹QecN/RNvNTmZP wBP RUJiM$Y1RNvNT
n



















QecNQSg?TewTecNRIP cI`[v?P cNQ-?W\P cNgŁRNvNTHKg?TMSY
n








{·MWIJLTXdSTW QeteQecNTSOL$M$RUQeteTX¤XQewBy?t TSJiJNTST£¸i¨hKW\P JLR´M$Y Y1QecN¡1?c?c?^p`[v?P cNQ9ŁQesTSJ^fl¸P OvNMt QSJ
±KW TSQet TXaVS??t P Jv?P cNg^Z\McN?Mc?^
jL~?~





















TecNRNW Tey$W TecNTe?WQet t TSg?TXt aNJP cNg£yNMt P RNP OLQetKOLMcNRUQSOLRUJ"RUM¦OP W O?wdSTcNR1RNvNT£t QS]ºJLTST5H9Zi¸?Te?wQec?^ oqvNM



















`[v?P cNTSJLT9RUTey$y?P cNg/RUMcNT9aecW MwxT

























P y?y?t TiMc3RNvNTi`[?t RN?W Qet
n
TXYst TSOLRNP Mc?|BP c`Qey?P RUQet P Jw­P c











































`Mwy?W TevTecNJP Mc?H5`MSgc?P RNP dST9VsJLaSOvNMt MSg?a9VsTeW JyNTXOLRNP dSTe|q^K` h5Z\TSMcNgiQecN/«f?JP Bo·`[W M$JLJZP cNg?P JLRNP O












P OLRUMeWpZP} JNMcIM$YxZPhQiKv?P cg











































V"ONM$RURN^eoq`KMWzyNMeW QSRUT-`KMcRNW Mt?QecNi`MeW\yMW QSRUT
n
?t Te1±ffW\P RUQeP cP cŁQec
©













{·MWQP JNONJLJP Mc¦M$YRNv?P J9QS?QeyNRUQSRNP McmP c9Qrv?P JLRUMW\P OLQetOLMecNRUTS¤SR¼JLTSTºŁZ¾u$aet TW\^oM$TXJ RNvNT
`Mwy?t TS¤eP RUaM$YI`KMwByNQec?P TSJ9ZzTXgP Jt QSRNP Mc
©
wyNTS$T ?cNRNW Ty?W TecNTe$W Jv?P y?Ç_uvNT f?Mcg£hMcNgN¤eyTeW\P TecNOLTe|
?Tet P dSTW TS5QSRflRNvNT`KMcNY TeW TecNONTMc
k














RŁvNQSJTSTecŁQW gNTXRNvNQSRQeNRNvNMW\P RUa/W Tet QSRNP McNJP ?TecNRNP YsP TS/Na-RNvNT
RUTeW\wJiyNQSRNW\P QeW OvNae^pyNQSRNW\P wMc?P Qet P JwB^QecN-YsP t P Qety?P TSRUa9W Tey$W TXJLTecNRxdSTeW a¼P Y Y	TeW TecNROLMewBy?t TX¤STSJBMSY[QXOLRNP Mc
P c
©
wByNTeW\P Qet`[v?P cNQ QecN£ŁTSJLRUTeW\c£??W MyTe^f?QewBP t RUMc?^oXVsQSRNW\P QeW OvNae^VsQSRNW\P wMc?P Qet P JwB^QecN¹{XP t P Qt



























WZP Tew)KP M$TiZP Mcg



















R£wQSa¬NT­cM$RUTSrRNvNQSR£ZP«hQ­Kv?P cNg½ Jm?Tet TSg?QSRNP Mc£MSY
wQecNQSg?TewTecNRW TXJyMcNJP ?P t P RNP TSJ wQSaNT MNRŁM$Y-cNTXOLTSJLJP RUa

HwMcNg?JLRŁRNvNTt QeW g$TSJLRŁ`[v?P cNTSJLT Y	QewBP t a
M$]_cNTX)MW3ONMcNRNW Mt t TX)TecNRUTeW\y$WzP JLTSJ¨P c)f?McNg°hMcNg°NM$RNv)t P JLRUTS)QecN°?c?t P JLRUTS°v?P J¨vNMt P cNg?J§QeW T
QewMcNg?JLRpRNvNTJwQet tKwBP cNMeW\P RUa5P cfl]_v?P Ov1RNvNTY	M?c?TeWxvNQSJ1JLM3Y	TX]º?t M$MS¦W Tet QSRNP dSTSJ¼P c1OLMcNRW Mt

f?T5vNQSJ
cNM$W M$RNvNTeWKQecN5cNMŁJP JLRUTeWpP c3f?McNg5hMcg

fP JflJLMcNJQeW TBaXM?cNgY	MeWQwQecM$Yv?P JflQSg?TŁQet RNvNMNgv3NM$RNv
M$Y1RNvNTew³QW TmP c-RNvNT¦Y	QewBP t am$NJP cNTSJLJ
1©
c-RNvNT¦aSTSQW J-M$Y«?NJP cNTSJLJiTX¤eyNQecNJP Mc/ZzTST9JP wy?t amvQS/RUM
?Tet TSg?QSRUT











wTeW OvNQecNP JNTeW\^$QeW T-W\?cNaBRNvNTBJLMcNJQecNgW QecN?JNMcNJMSYRNvNTeP WKY M?cN?TeW J

uvNTi±Qec?M$YNQSJLRHKJP QBQecN
RNvNT-P cNg§Z?cNg§±Qec?QeW T-JLRNP t tW\?cNa-RNvNT"JLMcNJQec?QeNgvNRUTW JMSYxRNvNT"Y	M?cNP cNgiY	QewBP t P TSJ

`KYxRNvNT
JLRNN?aM$YRNvNT KP cNOLTW T`M£Z\R´£P c9VZ\QS][RUMc?^oXN¤yNQecNP cNg£KvNQeW TevNMt $TeWx`McNRW MtpP c9f?McgmhMecNg|P c














{qMeWQ-OvNQecNgP cNg§yTeW J?yNTSOLRNP dST-JNTST-oXZP qT/{qQSRNvNTeW\^[bc?t P sT



















fl`KYIZ_K?cNaSQSP cNQSRUQe^?oq`[v?P cNTSJLTNOLMcNMwBP O«?t P RUTSJ«P c
©
cN?McNTSJP QeeH/VSW Tet P wBP cNQeW aRNN?ae|P c`[vNQecNgP cNg
©






























ŁTXT_g?TecNTW Qet t a-P ?P ^SOv
~












cIM$RNvNTeWMNRNvNQSJLRHKJP QecOLM?cNRNW\P TSJRNvNTW TBQW TBTX¤SQewBy?t TXJM$YeJNOLOLTSJNJLYs?tLONMcNgt MwxTeW QSRUTXJJNTSTBY MeW
TS¤SQewBy?t T
¢
QSRUMmoquvNT²Qet P w¿W M?yP c
©
cN$McNTSJP Qe3uvNT¹ÂTSdXTet My$wTecNR-QecN¾±TevNQSdeP M$WŁM$Y«RNvNT




































^SQecNBY MWffRNvNT_`[v?P cNTSJLTY	QewBP t a"?NJP cNTSJLJŁP cIuvNQeP t QecN
29 
 
JLTST®HÈKNTev?P W M^ o{qQewBP t a±ffNJP cNTSJLJ
n
TSQXJLJLTSJNJLTS£`KMeW\yMW QSRUTRNW\NOLRN?W T®QecNÉZ\QSRUTR´QeW RNP cNg
©












MNgt QSJ3`[t QSgNTi][QSJ«Qet JNM§W TSJ?yNMcNJP ?t TiY MW1??P t P cNg5RNvNTiYsP W JLRO?W MSJLJ¦vNQeWzNM$W[RN?c?cNTetP c5fhK^OLY





















P JLTBM$Y±KJP cNTSJLJ`KMWzyNMeW QSRNP McNJ3P c`[v?P cNQi{XW Mw
k
P cNgRUMVSW TSJLTecNRN^$`TecNRNW TBMSYHKJP QecRNNP TXJ^$uvNT

























uvNT§Mc?t a§OLMwByNTSRNP RNP McP ct Q$RUTeW"yNTW\P M$$J^IY	MeW_TS¤SQewy?t T§RNvNT¨t QSRUT
c?P cNTSRUTSTecNRNvQecNTSQeW\t aBRU]pTecNRNP TSRNvOLTecNRN?W a][QSJYsW Mw§ŁTXJLRUTeW\cIONQey?P RUQet ^?NRTSdSTecvNTeW TBRNvNTiP cNJLRNP RNNRNP Mc





ONYV[uZ\TST^$oX±KNJP cNTSJLJ¸?TSRU]pMWzsJQecNVsQSRURUTeW\cNJM$Ye`QecNRUMcNTXJLT`MewBy$W QS$MW JQec
k



































`McNRW QSJLRxRNvNT¼$TSdSTet My?wTecNR[M$YRNvNT9±KW\P RNP Jv-±ffW TS]_P cNg
©







J?^BwQecNa)?W TX]_P cNg OLMewByNQec?P TSJMyNTW QSRUTSºwBNOvQSJ5RNvNTXa)vNQS§?McNT
NTSY MW Te^P T3QSJ"{qQwBP t a5?NJP cNTSJLJNTSJ^?NR1wQecNa5wQS$T3RNvNT3RNW QecNJP RNP Mc1YsW Mew£Q3Y	QewBP t aNQSJLTX¼RUM«QwMW T




uvNT)P cNRNW M$NOLRNP McM$YBRNW QeP cNTSº$W TX][TeW J^
OLMwByNQecaŁJLTXOW TSRUQeW\P TSJ^t QS]paSTeW JQecN5t QSRUTeW\^?QSOLONM?cNRUQecNRUJ^?RUM?W TS]_P cNg5M$QeW ?Jg?QSdXTŁONMwByNQec?P TSJ3wMW T
M$YRNvNTJ?SP t t JcNTSOLTSJNJLQeW aRUMRNvNT_TSY	Y TSOLRNP dST_J?yNTW deP JP McM$YQ-wxM$$TeW\cB?NJP cNTSJLJITecNRUTeWzy?W\P JLT

uv?P JŁvNTet yNTS
























cMcTTXO?W\P RNP TSJ3QecN {XNR?W TSJ3`KMwBwBP JLJP McP cNdSTSJLRNP cNg?QSRNP McP cNRUMRNvNTiQSY	Y	QeP W JMSYQf?McNg§hMcNg
t P JLRUTS-OLMwByNQeca9P Rx][QSJBP JLOLMSdXTeW TX-RNvNQSRxRNvNT9vNTSQS-M$YpRNvNT¼OLMwByNQecNa¼MSY	RUTec-wQS?T¼Q¼?TSOP JP Mc_]_v?P Ov
][M?t 9RNvNTec¦NTONMwBwB?c?P OLQSRUTS^P cNRUTeWQet P Qe^a5RUTet Ty?vNMcNT wxTSJLJLQSg$T5RUMM$QeW mwxTewBTeW J¼QSJ¼Q5$T
Y	QSOLRUM?TXOP JP McM$YRNvNT"NM$QW 
©
cRUTeW deP TX]9]_P RNvIY	MeW\wTWff{q`¼MSY	YsP OP Qet

¶Lµ
HKOLONMeW P cNg"RUM«McNT5W TXOLTecNR_W TeyNMeW R_P cNRUM¼RNvNT¦W Mt T3M$YRNvNT«OLMewyNQecNa«JNTSOW TSRUQeW a5P c"f?McNg hMcNg9?y_RUM
¶Ê
MSYt P JLRUTS£ONMwByNQec?P TXJ9?Tt TSg?QSRUT JvNQeW TevMt ?TW-W TSgP JLRNW QSRNP Mc¦QecN¹W Tet QSRNP McNJ9RUMMNRUJP $T§YsP W\wJ^
















`[Hp^oquvNTrZ\TXg?Qet1ZP Qe?P t P RNP TSJ M$Y3RNvNT
`MwyNQecNa)TSOW TSRUQeW a|QSRRNvNTHKJP Qec Z\QS]
l
M?W\cNQet J5`KMcNY	TW TecOLTMc`KMwByNQeca)TXOW TSRUQW\P TSJ Z\TSg?Qet























QeSP cNgŁuvNTuvNTSMW TSRNP OLQtpQecN


























cNRUTeW deP TS]9]_P RNvŁwQecNQSg?TwTcNROLMcNJ?t RUQecNR


















3¸?M$RUTŁRNvNTBP Y Y	TeW TecNOLTSJ3NTSR´][TXTec3±KW\P RNP JvQecN3TeW\wQec3wQecNQXg$TeW J«P cRNv?P J«W TSJyTSOLR

uvNTt QSRURUTeWpvNQSdST
QiW Tet QSRNP dSTet ait M$]yM$][TWKP JLRUQecNONTBJLOLMeW Tit P sTBRNvNTi±KW\P RNP Jv?NRQv?P gv?cNOLTeW RUQeP cNRUaBQSdSMP ?QecNOLTBJLONMW Te^$ONY











uvNTeP WxP Y	Y TeW TecNONTSJ9P c3QSRURNP RNN?TSJ¼RUM5QecN£NJLTMSYwxTSTSRP cNg?J¼QeW T wQW\qTSt aP Y Y	TW TecNRflQXJ¼QeW T
RNvNTeP WQSRURNP RLN?T RUM/RNvNT RUMt TeW QecNOLT Y	MeWQewB?P g?P RUa QecN)NJLT M$Y¼v??wM?WRUM/TSQSJLT¡W Tet QSRNP McNJv?P yJQecN
OLMcNYst P OLRQecN¦cNM$RUTRNvNTwQeW\sTS5±KW\P RNP Jv«y?W QSOLRNP OLTMSYP cNª TSOLRNP cNg¦v?wM?WxP cNRUM5wM$JLRflwB?cN?QecNTW TSÁNTSJLRUJ






QecNQSgP cNg§P c±KW\P RUQeP cŁQecN
TeW\wQecae^eR
k





































































































9V5Z\QS][RUMc?^oXP W TSOLRUMeW J½
n
TwB?cNTeW QSRNP Mc?^±TecNTXYsP RUJ"QecNm¤SRNW QSOLRNP McNJ^Qec«HpcNQet aSJP J¼M$YRNvNTeP Wb$JLTSJ^




















ONM$RURN^$oquvNTSMW TSRNP OLQet{XW QwTX][MeW\QecN
n














































¼`KMwByNQW QSRNP dST¾VsTeW JyNTXOLRNP dSTSJ^

















































































TST£¸$M$Tet[{X?cNg^oKvNQeW TevMt ?TeW J
À









¤SOLTXJLJP dST5W TewB?cNTeW QSRNP Mc_QecN t QW g?T5?cNJLTSO??W TS t M$QecNJRUM¼QXJLJNM$OP QSRUTS"ONMwyNQec?P TSJ
][TeW T-JLMwT"M$YxRNvNT-OLQeNJLTSJMSYxRNvNT-Jy?t P RŁP cŁRNvNTiY	QewBP t a

uv?P J5P JQ/wM$?TeW\cf?McNg§hMcgTS¤SQewy?t T-MSY
`MvNTec?½ J«$TSJLO?W\P yNRNP Mc3M$YIRNvNT§y$W M$OLTSJNJLTSJ¦a]_v?P Ov3Qª MP cNRY	QewBP t ae½ J«JLTecNJLTMSYŁvNQeW\wMca§} 3][M

P J
JLQeNM$RUQSg$TS5YsW Mwº]_P RNv?P c?oXP RflJLTSTewJ¼Ot TSQWxRNvNQSRflQ?Tet P NTW QSRUTTSY	Y MW RflR´M5Y MW OLT§yNQeW RNP RNP Mc¦P J9P cNdSMt dXTS
]_vNTec§QY	QewBP t ae½ J JvNQeW\P cNg°y$W QSOLRNP OLTSJ QeW T³P cNOW TSQSJP cNgt aONMwy?W MwBP JLTS°aRNvNT¾W TSYsNJLQetM$Y"JLMwT
P cNP deP NQet J5RUM§OLMcNRNW\P ?NRUTRNvNTeP W¼t QeNM$W1QecN RNP wT/MW«NaRNvNT/MNRNW\P gvNRTewBTSÃLÃt TewTecNRMSYY QewBP t a
Ys?cN?J|q^
k
ZB`MvNTec?^flf?MNJLTbec?P RUTS^flf?MNJLT£P deP $TSuvNT¦`pv?P cNTSJLT£{qQewBP t a£P c"u$QeP ][Qec?^`Mt ?wB?P Q





































TecNRN?W TSJ½P ciuW QS?T QecN
©
cNdSTSJLRNwTecNRiZ\QS]¿P cf?McNg)hMcNg^[TS?J















































ŁQecNg^Ioq`[v?P cNTSJLT¨Z\TSQS$TeW Jv?P y5QecN
31 
 




































































uevNTO?t RN?W Qet?P QSJ¦P J3dSTW aiP Y YsP O??t RY	MWpHpcNgt M
¥
HpwTW\P OLQec5W TSJLTSQW OvNTeW J^
QecN-RNvNM$JLT9P cNYst NTecNOLTS/a¼RNvNTewB^KRUM"QSdSMP ^KgP dSTecRNvNQSRcNTSQeW\t a¼Qet tSM$YpRNvNTeP WOLMcNJLRNW\NOLRUJBQecN-RNvNTSMW\P TXJ
Y	MeW?cN?TW JLRUQecNP cNgBQecNBOLQSRUTSg$MWzP JP cNgwQecNQSg?TewTecNRTewQecNQSRUT_YsW MwRNvNT-v?P gv?t a"P cNP deP NQet P JLRNP OHcNgt M
¥

















































±QeP JNM$R«QecNÄ)¿ZP QecNg^oquvNTº¸?QSRN?W T MSY
k
QecNQSg$TeW\P QetŁMWz P c¦RNvNT `[v?P cNTSJLT¨?cNRUTeW\y$W\P JLT
n


























AZ\TSTe^oq`[v?P cNTSJLT ÂTSOP JP Mc
k





























{·MWKQOLMcJP ?TW QSRNP McMSY

























Y MeWIf?MSY	JLRUTS$Te½ JJLONMW TSJ_M$YflffwBP RNv_QecN"ŁQecNg"J?y$W Qe^c
j?j
Qy?yTXQeW JRUM




{qMeWP cNJP gvNR)P cNRÏM¾RNvNT
y?v?P t M$JLMy?v?P OLQeteQewB?P g?P RUa¦M$Y1RNvT9`[v?P cNTSJLTmwBP cN/JLTST
n
-Hpt t P JNMc?^poqHpc-dXTeW deP TS]rM$Y1uvNT9`[v?P cNTSJLT
k
P cN|P cbcN?TeW JLRUQecNP cNgRNvNTi`[v?P cNTSJLT
k











{qMeWflRNvNTt N$P RNP Jw°MSY`[v?P cNTSJLT/O?W QSY	RUJwxTecQecNg?P t ?J P cRNvNTc?P cNTSRUTSTecNRNvOLTecNRN?W ae^xJLTXT
l
k







M$YRNvNT¸$MW RNv`[v?P cNQ±KW QecNOvŁM$YxRNvNT
n
MSaSQetHKJP QSRNP O5M$OP TSR´a
µ









cNJLRNP RNRNP McNQet{qQSOLRUMW J-P c_RNvNT¦ÂTSOt P cNT«M$YRNvNT






















































JLTXT¨ŁZ¾³u$aet TeW\^oÂM$TXJ9RNvNT OLMewBy?t TS¤eP RUa MSY`KMwByNQec?P TSJmZ\TSgP J?t QSRNP Mc
©
wyNTS$T ?cNRNW Tey?W TecNTe?W Jv?P y$ÇuvNT f?McNghMcNgN¤eyTeW\P TecNONTe|1yNQyNTeW$Tet P dSTeW TSiQSRRNvNT"`McNY	TW TecOLT"Mc
k









































u/f?QSRURUMW\P ^oq]_cNTeW Jv?P yBQec
k

















































































































KNTev?P W M^ŁJ?y?W Q¬cr

^ivNQSJ£TewBy?vNQSJP JLTSrRNvNT¨JNOLOLTXJNJ£M$YTS¤SRUTec?TS­yNMt aXg?QewMJ£Y	QewBP t a
?NJP cNTSJLJLTSJ«gP deP cNg5TSQSOv3M$RNvNTeW1wBNRNNQetffJ?y?yNMW RN^IP c3Q§y?W M P cNNJLRNW\P QetÂOLMcNRUTS¤SRN^MNJNTeW deP cNg5QoqOt TSQeW
P cNRUTecNRMcRNvNT°yNQeW RM$YiY	QewBP t a°?NJP cNTSJLJRUM¬wQeP cNRUQeP cºP cNRUQ$OLRQecNºTSdSTec TS¤eyNQecºRNvNT)Y	QewBP t ae½ J



















































TST9g?TecNTW Qet t a HrV"ŁMt Y1QecN`¹£fNQecNg^
k




















«ËflNQS?QXgcNM^uvNT9{qQewBP t a P c
À
QW\P MNJB`[?t RN?W TSJŁQSRy
µ

1`Z\TXTe^-oq`[v?P cNQe½ JºuW QSP RNP McNQet{qQewBP t ae^
©











V_±«??W TSae^Xo{qQewBP t a
©




ÂTSBM$J?SP c¼TSR1Qet ^uvNT£bc?P dSTeW JP RUa5M$Y
k












































































































































ŁRNvNTeW T-][TeW T-OP W OLQ
?

yNTSRNP RNP MecNJP JLJNTS§P cŁRNvNT/fP gvŁ`M?W RMcŁRNvNT
NQSJP JŁMSY[ªqNJLRQecN-TSÁ?P RUQe?t T¼]_P cNP cNg?y?^RNvNT wQSª MeW\P RUa¼M$Yp]_v?P OviwQS?T"Qet RUTW\cNQSRNP dST"Ot QeP wJBMecBRNvNT














«ZŁMcNg^-oquvNT°`[v?P cNTSJNT,{qQewBP t a»{XP W\w
n
TSdeP JP RUTS¡fP ??Tec¬P wTecNJP McNJ|¡y$W TSJLTecNRUTX­QSR
OLMcNY	TW TecNONTBTecNRNP RNt TSuvNT
n
P JLTBMSY±KNJP cNTSJLJ`KMWzyNMeW QSRNP McNJ3P c`[v?P cNQBYsW Mw
k
P cNgRUMVSW TXJLTecNRN^$`TecNRNW TBMSY



























































{qMeW¦y?W M?t TewJ MSYiJOLOLTSJNJP Mc¨P cºbh¡Y	QewBP t aOLMwyNQec?P TSJJNTST
l




















{·MeWIQ¦JLRNN?a¦M$YflRNv?P J-?M??t T¦QecNOLTSJLRNW a£P c"RNvNT¦HpNJLRLW Qet P Qec
OLMcNRUTS¤SRN^ÂJLTST5V
n





























































HffJQ¦W TXJ?t RN^ffRNvNT¦K{q`vNQSJQet RUTeW TS"RNvNT«JvNQeW T¦?NaNQSOflONM$$T«RUM9y$W M$RUTXOLR[RNvNT¦NQeW g$QeP c?P cNg
yNM$JP RNP McM$YRNvNT-wBP cMW\P RUa

j











































TST£V¦Z\QS][R´Mc?^oXP W TSOLRUMeW\½ J
n
TewB?cNTW QSRNP Mc?^fl±TecNTXYsP RUJ-QecN¡N¤SRNW QSOLRNP McJ^Qec"HpcNQet aSJP J"M$YRNvNTeP W














c«RNvNT t QSJLRflRU][M5aXTSQeW J¼RNvTeW T vNQSdXT NTXTec«RU][M5J?yNTXOLRUQSO?t QeWP cNJLRUQecNOLTSJ¼MSYoqONMWzyNMeW QSRUT W QeP ?TeW J|
y??W OvNQSJP cNgŁQJNY YsP OP TecNRNt a-t QeW g?T_JvNQeW TevNMt P cNgP cŁt P JLRUTSŁOLMwyNQc?P TSJRUMBg?QeP cI?TY	QSOLRUMBONMcNRNW MtN]1P RNvNMNR
RNW\P g?g?TW\P cNg§Q/u$fl±

uvNTW QeP ?TeW J vNQSdST/RNvNTec§y?W M$OLTXTS?TX§RUMwBP t -RNvNT/OLMwByNQec?P TSJ§Na/RNW QecNJNY	TeWzW\P cg
QSJLJLTSRUJ3RUMRNvNTew¨QSRv?P gvMSdSTW dXQet NTSJ

uvNTideP OLRNP wJ3RUTecN?TSR´MNTi]pTet tTSJLRUQe?t P JvNTS^OLQSJvW\P OvQecN














M$YRNvNT`MwByNQec?P TSJ¼flW P cNQecNOLT Na
k
W¸P OvNMt QSJ¼Hpt t Tec¦P cLRUM5RNvNT




MNTW RBZ\TSTXJP cRUM-RNvNT"QXY	Y	QeP W JBM$Ypu$MwJNMciVsQSOP YqP OZ\RU
QecNiŁMW\t iueW QS?T¼`TecNRNW T"W M$yiZ\RU





























































TyNMeW RNxHpc3flW P cNQecOLTY	MeW
RNvNT

j
JLR`TecNRN?W a_QSRyNQeW Q

j

j
	


 
 
 
